Putin has brought into the world’s awareness the word “annexation.” A lot of people likely think they know what it means and some of them are more than likely right. But it’s complicated, looking at its history and trying to guess what’s going to happen.

Nearly everyone knows that to be annexed means something(historically, usually, a country or other piece of land)has been taken possession of by a new ruler. There is, I think, also a kind of maybe subconscious feeling that this includes not just ruling but owning it and in a sense more serious than one might own a colony or distant-from-the-capital province.

This has happened to some degree or other, so many times in history that it would be a fool’s errand to try to do an exhaustive study of this short of a book length effort. I shall confine myself here to maybe two or three historical examples of annexation and try to explain what they brought about. After that I want to speculate on what Putin’s intent is, what his likelihood of success and what this may mean for the world, particularly East Europe, NATO and the West.

First of all, the meaning of the word is, primarily “union,” mainly a political union of some kind. It does seem to have with it the implication and/or assumption that the change was the result of someone beating someone else, militarily or diplomatically(maybe both). The first one I want to present to you is the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary a few years before World War I. And already I have raised questions that require explanations.

Bosnia-Herzegovina may be regarded as one –well, thing–country, province, place, whatever. The reason for the dual name is something that goes back to the Middle Ages if not earlier and I am not going to deal with it here. It was for many years part of the Ottoman or Turkish Empire which ruled out of Constantinople. This Empire was founded at some date in the late 14th century or the early 15th. It had ruled parts of Asia, Africa and eastern Europe for many years . Ever since the fall of Napoleon nearly a hundred years earlier the Western Powers had been anticipating its collapse, but it was still staggering along in the first decade of the 20th century. It was still big enough with a large enough military to be, in certain circumstances, at least a nuisance and maybe a lot worse.

In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin, mainly intended by the Western Powers to put a brake on Russian expansion, included a part affecting B-H as I shall now refer to it Bosnia-Herzegovina. It stated that from then on Austria-Hungary would “administer” B-H while it would remain, technically, part of the Ottoman Empire. This meant that if you visited there you would find Austrian businessmen, civil servants and diplomats running the place, but if you looked on the map you would see the place belonged, geographically to the Ottomans. The Ottomans were no doubt irritated by this but they had no way of preventing it and were forced to accept this face-saving act while actually taking a defeat.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire had been around for over 40 years in 1908 and resulted from a uniting of what was left of the old Hapsburg lands(once the Holy Roman Empire) and the Hungarian “nation.” I use the quotation marks because the Hungarian people were actually divided into 2 or 3 identifiable entities which is very confusing and need not detain us further.

Suffice it to say that the two national groups, Austrians and Hungarians, were now all in the same Empire, each with a large number of sometimes restless minorities. The Austrians and Hungarians largely ran their own separate affairs, but were united by being ruled by the Hapsburg monarch and by having a common military and a common foreign ministry, so that together they presented themselves to the rest of the world as one country. It could be argued, I think, that they had already seen their best days and were declining, but not as quickly as the Ottomans and here was an opportunity to add some power in Eastern Europe, their old stamping ground.

So the Dual Monarchy, another name for Austria-Hungary, actually ruled B-H and got practically all of the benefits of a conqueror. They chose as a matter of convenience and diplomacy to allow the Ottomans to maintain in public the fantasy that B-H belonged to their empire. But in 1908 an uproar came out of Constantinople. A group of younger army officers(The “Young Turks”), disgusted with the apparent weakness and foolishness of their empire, pulled off a sort of coup in which they effectively took charge, although they kept their monarch, the Sultan on the throne and theoretically in power.

But these guys were ambitious and to outsiders no doubt looked as if they might do about anything. Apparently, the Dual Monarchy feared that they would try to take back real control of B-H. That would directly contradict their own ambitions in the Balkans which was about the only place left they could be ambitious. They decided to move quickly to make B-H theirs in law and theory as well as in practical fact and in the autumn of 1908 they announced their “annexation” to the world.

Now I think that this meant very little to most of the residents of B-H, at least in their ordinary day-to-day experience. They had been ruled by the Dual Monarchy and they would continue to be. But now the Dual Monarchy was their ruler in theory as well as fact. In any event, whatever the feeling in B-H, this stirred up a Hornet’s nest(several of them) of opposition around Europe. The Russians had been leading the Pan-Slavic movement by which they intended to bring all the Slavic nations of Eastern Europe into their sphere and possibly more than just their sphere. B-H was full of Slavs, but now would be also not just ruled by the DM but part of its sovereignty. This would impede the advance of Russia’s Slavic leadership plans.

Within B-H itself there was no doubt some dissatisfaction. They did not like the Austro-Hungarians much but they were also no big fans of the Turks and they may have resented being played with in the diplomatic board game. Some of them doubtless went so far as to dream of a a small, independent B-H state. But the greatest fury may have come from Serbia. This country, to the east of B-H, was the most ambitious of the South Slav states and had within its borders a large number of dreamers of expansion, of creating a greater Serbia that would include much of the Balkan peninsula. The solidifying of the Hapsburg(Austrian)rule there would make their dreams more difficult to fulfill. Among these dreamers there was a disturbed young man named Gavrilo Princep. He would later, in the name of Serbian glory, take part in an assassination which ultimately would kill about 9 million people.

So there is no doubt that this “annexation” of B-H created troubles, troubles that had been small before and now were large, or new troubles altogether. While the practical day-to-day of B-H changed little immediately, a cause was created, or rather several of them and the Balkans, always an area of trouble, would now be worse. Because Russia had been weakened by losing a war with Japan and then having to work its way through serious civil unrest, it was in no way able to intervene in all this. All it could do was protest and it did. Some Russian leaders swore they would not be caught this way again, weak and humiliated by other powers. And in an eerily accurate anticipation of 1914, Germany assured the Dual Monarchy of its support. This sounds very, very like the much disputed “blank check” they would(apparently) give the Hapsburg leaders again six years later. That time it led to a World War.

Another notable “annexation” occurred in China 1931-1932. This involved the Japanese and the Chinese province of Manchuria. Although long related, the Manchurian and the Chinse were originally two distinct peoples(well, maybe not to Westerners) and the Manchu(or Qing) Dynasty, 1644-1912 was usually considered by Chinese historians a “foreign” dynasty.

Manchuria was, in 1931, more or less universally accepted as part of China, though a distinct and individual part. It was rich in natural resources and the Japanese, cranking up their war machine for conquests needed all of those that they could get. It appears that this was mostly, if not entirely, an army effort and that the civil government in Tokyo knew little if anything about it. The Army generals pulled it off in a fit of expansionist enthusiasm and presented their government with a fait accompli. Now it was up to the government to deal with it and early in 1932 after the collapse of the Chinese resistance, Japan claimed it a part of their empire.

In point of fact this was not regarded by the Japanese as an annexation. They simply took it, deciding at least to put a more acceptable (if not very believable) face on their action by installing a deposed Chinse Emperor as King.(Later known as “Emperor”–this was Puyi, of the Qing Dynasty, the “Last Emperor” of Bertoluci’s movie) Theoretically, he ruled a new nation, Manchukuo. Actually, he took orders from the Japanese and did their bidding. “Manchukuo” was now Japan’s including the natural resources it needed.

There was a lot of angry talk about this at the League of Nations and elsewhere, but it was fairly clear from the beginning that there would be no action. The rest of the world was trying to deal with the now settling in Great Depression and had no time for international commitments. And still fairly recent World War I memories were yet another disincentive.

About the only nation to do much of anything(rather oddly, given the strength of American isolationism a few years later)was the US. It announced the Stimson Doctrine(named for Secretary of State Stimson)which at least told the Japanese the US was unhappy with them. But all it really said was that if Japan committed any more aggressive acts and took more land, the US would not recognize the new conquests. There was no threat of refusing recognition of what had already taken place. The Japanese seemed to take a “Big deal, we’ll worry later, if at all” attitude and. logically speaking, it’s hard to blame them.

Some historians consider this the beginning of Word War II although that is a rather fanciful idea in my opinion. What it did do was give Japan needed resources and, more importantly, it encouraged the idea that Japan and other potential aggressors(maybe in Europe?)needn’t worry too much about the Western Democracies. The democracies, the dictators would think, would not seriously resist their depredations. This was wrong, of course, but it was a long time being proved.

The other case I want to consider is one that students of 20th century Europe will recognize. This is the “Anschluss,” the taking of Austria by Germany in 1938. After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian empire after WWI, the nation state of Austria survived, but without the Empire which now became several different countries.(The dismantling of Soviet Russia’s empire as it broke into small, independent states after the USSR collapsed is similar) It is worth remembering that Austrians are essentially Germans, coming from the same ancestors and culture and separated from each other only by political events and borders. So it was natural that the two peoples would have a lot of fellow feeling and regard each other as at least natural allies, if not fellow countrymen. I think it would be correct to say that they were as much alike as Canadians and Americans.

Nonetheless, after Hitler rose to power in Germany, there was hesitation in Austria about being too close. A number of Austrian leaders, apparently with a sizeable following, objected to Nazism and wanted nothing to do with it. They got some support from Mussolini who wasn’t quite sure he was Hitler’s buddy yet, although perhaps now leaning that direction.

But there was also a group of influential Austrians who liked Nazism and wanted to join Germany. Frustrated by lack of cooperation from others, this group launched a powerful but ultimately unsuccessful revolt against the established government in 1934, their intention being to oust that government and put a Nazi one in its place. The revolt failed and many of the leaders fled to Germany where they would continue to plan for a unification of the two countries.

For the next few years there was agitation in Austria for a closer relationship with Germany. The government, though fairly right wing, refused to go as far as the Austrian Nazis wanted them to. Mussolini gave up his liking for Austrian independence and decided he was firmly on the side of Hitler. And in early 1938 Hitler prevailed upon Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg to make some internal changes which would give pro-Nazi Austrians positions of more power. Schuschnigg agreed, but then took steps to solidify his support among anti Nazi-Groups ranging from communists to monarchists. Then he called for a referendum on the issue of unification with Germany.

Hitler was seriously disturbed by this and bullied Schuschnigg into resigning. I have found it difficult to determine if the plebiscite was still to go on or not. But the date was already set for the referendum vote and the day before German troops marched into Austria. There there was virtually no resistance to them and many Austrians welcomed them as heroes. A plebiscite quickly confirmed this with the Nazi takeover geting, to no one’s surpise, well over 90% approval.

After this Austria was essentially part of Germany. Google “Map of Europe, 1938” and you will get several choices. Nearly all of them will show an expanded Germany, perhaps with the word “Austria” appearing just below western Czechoslovakia. But there are no borders indicating it is anything separate. It was hitched to Hitler’s Germany now and would remain so until the end of the war.

So, in each of these cases what, if anything, may we learn? Are there any lessons for the world today?

In the case of B-H we have a powerful though possibly slightly declining nation asserting the practical control it had had for decades. Now it is established as law and, formally, part of the European system of states. The main thing that happens here is that mostly other nations get hurt feelings or fury or both. Particularly Russia and Serbia are resentful of what they must see as a Germanic nation’s interference in their Slavic adventure plans.

The effect on the subsequent slide into European chaos and war over the next half dozen years, is difficult to trace exactly and the status of this action as a “cause” of the war is somewhat questionable. But there is no question that it de-stabilized the Balkan Peninsula and perhaps hardened already existing suspicions between peoples. And it is arguable that it played a role in the two chaotic “Balkan Wars” which occurred shortly before the outbreak of WWI and were themselves anything but a stabilizing factor.

In the case of the Japanese establishment of Manchukuo there was an action that at least has a resemblance to the usual understanding of annexation. The Japanese assertion of military control was fairly quick and once finished, appears to have been quite thorough. The use of the deposed Chinese Emperor fooled more or less no one. What the Japanese were doing was obvious.

The Japanese gained, as previously noted, some valuable resources and maybe also an unfortunate feeling of self-confidence. They(along with Hitler and Mussolini)may have gotten the idea the Western democracies would accede to their demands. They were wrong, but did not figure this out until it was too late. There was some dissention in the Japanese cabinet in 1941 over whether to attack the US. Enough of the important men there apparently felt the US would be found unable and/or unwilling to respond. There were other reasons for this feeling, of course, some of the coming from far away, but this initial strike at China in 1931 may be been as significant consideration.

In the case of the Anschluss, the issues are rather simpler and clearer that in the first 2 instances. Austria and Germany shared a lot of common history, culture, etc. They were natural allies. But a majority of Austrians, perhaps fairly sizeable at first, had enough doubts about Hitler and his leadership to be suspicious of outright alliance or unification of the two countries.

After the failure of the 1934 revolt to install a Nazi government, the Austrian Nazis continued to work with the Germans to bring about Hitler’s eventual victory. This came in 1938 over the opposition of Chancellor Schuschnigg but after an apparent shift in popular opinion which made the Germans welcome to many Austrian citizens. While Austria would likely have been attached to Germany one way or the other in any event, this accomplished the task at a convenient time for the Germans, with Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia about the come to the fore , thus arranging European politics for the Munich agreements to follow.

So, how does this compare with the current situation regarding Putin, the Ukraine and his “annexing” of four Eastern Ukrainian provinces? In what ways do we see similarities? In what ways are there differences? What, if anything, is to be exected now?

The first thing to grasp is that doing this thoroughly in a blog or a column is impossible. It would take at least a long magazine length article, maybe a book, which I doubt you want to read and which I am not about to write. What I am going to do(I hope)is skim some history off of a very complicated situation and then, given our other knowledge and common sense, do some speculation. If you want to pursue the details try Wikipedia, which has what appear to be pretty good introductions to both Crimea and Ukraine, and check out The Economist’s article on Ukraine(and online). The Economist is about my favorite source of political-economic(sometimes other too)information.

First, let’s acknowledge that both Crimea and Ukraine have long and extremely complicated histories., Over the past 1-2 centuries this has included their history with Russia which has dominated if not ruled outright both of them most of the time. At one point in the 1950’s Stalin transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. This would be sort of like transferring the Michigan UP to Wisconsin(which would be unconstitutional, incidentally)–Crimea was still part of the USSR but now administered by the Ukrainian part of the country.

Stalin, of course, had no idea of the Soviet Union collapsing. This is exactly what happened, however, about 4 decades later. As you no doubt know nearly all of the non-Russian “Republics” became independent nations thus creating problems for Geography teachers and students and huge opportunities for map makers. These included Ukraine which established itself as independent in 1991 and, thanks to Stalin’s no doubt unintentional largess, took Crimea with it.

About the first two decades or so of this new arrangement are rife with difficulties and quarrelling in Ukraine. This is a minefield of opinions and issues where I do not wish to fall into taking you with me. Suffice it to say the country was divided, mainly along Russian-speaking and pro-Russian people on one side(largely in the east) and Ukrainian-speaking, anti Russian people on the other(largely in the west). It’s not that simple, however, and involves some Byzantine-type politics and quarrels which we will leave alone. The main thing to remember, is that in 2013-2014, things changed when Ukrainian politics got even nastier(it appears one presidential candidate poisoned the other one)and Russia intervened more directly. They(Moscow)announced they were annexing Crimea and sent some troops there. They still claim it which is likely to be a difficult part of any possible peace talks

The West(like Ukraine)was faced with a conundrum. There appeared to be no way of getting the Russians out, so the only choices were to accept this, at least without an out and out fight, or to risk World War III. This confounded a lot of Western leaders. President Obama decided it wasn’t worth the risk and did not take the chances which would have accompanied sending troops or threatening Russia by moving US forces in the areas closer. This may have been a mistake but I suspect most of Europe was relieved as most of them were relieved by the Munich agreement of 1938. Obama did remind European leaders of something they already knew–there was a definite threat coming to European gas supplies if the Russians turned out and out hostile. While I question the Obama Administration’s actions here, it was a very difficult situation, and it should be kept in mind that since Ukraine was not a NATO country(still isn’t) the US was not failing to live up to a treaty obligation.

Meanwhile, on the ground something approaching a civil war started. It wasn’t usually called that, but that was what it was. In Eastern Ukraine, pro-Russians armed themselves and made some moves toward independence. They were assisted by Russian troops not wearing insignia that identified them as such. So Russia was fighting to expand into Ukraine but didn’t want to admit it publicly.

Soon fighting broke out between these Eastern Ukrainian units and their Russia allies on one hand, and the Ukrainian Army on the other. As the decade passed the west began to supply limited support in the form of weapons to Ukraine, and moved some of its European based military forces into positions to possibly defend Ukraine. They were admirably careful not to spark a direct conflict with the Russian troops. This was a sort of “mission creep” in which the west got close and closer to Ukraine but still had not made a significant commitment of any kind.

This changed as the new decade began and Russia got more aggressive. In 2021 Putin began moving more troops towards Ukraine and appeared to be getting ready for an out-and-out invasion. This would unmask(if it needed any unmasking)the Russian attitude in East Ukraine but since nearly everybody interested knew there were Russian troops there anyway it was not going to be a large surprise. Western Intelligence services began announcing what was going on and the West made clear its support for Ukraine though it(wisely)offered no hard and fast military commitment.

By January, 2022 it was clear to anyone who cared to watch TV news or listen to radio reports that war was likely. While Putin continued to deny invasion was his intent, western intelligence units rated the chance of a invasion of Ukraine as overwhelming and predicted with a fair degree of accuracy the timing. When Putin’s forces struck in late February almost no one was surprised.

What was surprising, however, was the resistance of the Ukrainians. Instead of folding they fought back and NATO countries began to send large numbers of weapons and a lot of money. Putin, having expected a victory in a few weeks or less was set back on his haunches. In subsequent months the Russians achieved some advances, then lost them as the Ukrainians pursued successful counter-attacks. The back-and-forth has mostly continued, but the situation seems to have settled into being one in which the Russians maintain air superiority with missiles, drones, and planes, and the Ukrainians, through the resilience of their army and a lot of Western support and supplies, hold their own on the ground.

In late September, apparently growing desperate, Putin announced the “annexation” of Luhansk, Donestsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. These are all provinces of Ukraine, occasionally known as “oblasts.” This Russian word(oblast)appears to have no translation into other languages and has historically been used to mean, more or less, “province.” Incidentally, Luhansk and Donetsk together comprise “Donbas,” which as nearly as I am able to tell is just a name for part of eastern Ukraine. (“Oblast” appeared on “Jeopardy” a couple of nights ago, although I do not remember in what context)

It appears that the Russians did not have complete control of any of these as they held referendums in each one and then announced the annexation. To no one’s surprise, the vote was heavily in favor of joining Russia in all cases although the reliability of the figures is, to put it mildly, questionable. The Russian grip on these areas seems not to be as strong as they would like it to be so the “annexations” may turn out to be in-name-only or -on-paper-only. But theoretically, at least according to Russia, the four oblasts are now part of Russia rather than Ukraine.

For awhile it appeared that Russian land forces were making something of a comeback but that apparently has ceased. The situation in Eastern Ukraine appears to be quickly changing and difficult to verify. There is a very confusing situation with the supremely important nuclear facility in Zaporizhia which seems to be still run by Ukrainian technicians while Russia claims the territory. This makes no sense, but there it is. Meanwhile, the battle for Bakhmut continues.

The significance of this is two-fold(at least). If you believe this really has happened, that Russia has really taken back this land ,then Putin may be able to claim a small victory, but not one he would have bragged about planning very much. Even as claimed by Russia, it would be snatching a small victory from the still grinning jaws of a large defeat. More seriously, it would mean that according to Putin’s theory, an attack on any of these four oblasts would now be not just part of a Ukrainian civil war or defense against a Russian invasion of Ukraine. It would be an attack on “Mother Russia,” and, in Putin’s mind, perhaps, justify the use of whatever he thought necessary to use as defense. This is what I hope keeps leaders awake at night in Washington, Moscow, Kyiv and a lot of other places. The more insomnia this induces, the better the chances they will find a way out.

A way out, an “off ramp” for Putin is definitely needed. Common sense and history largely agree here. If we look at the three cases of annexation with which I began, we may note the following–In case of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is not a direct line from the incident to conflict. But it provided bad feelings, instability and more violence in an area already full of these things. It is arguable the this Russian attempt to “annex” the four Ukrainian provinces will have a similar effect, leaving behind a large amount of hostility and disappointment, and making negotiation success more difficult.

In the cases of Manchuria being annexed by Japan, and the Anschluss of Germany and Austria, the case is, to some extent, rather plain. Both times the aggressive powers were allowed to proceed. In both cases, but more clearly in the Anschluss case, war started by aggressive dictators was the result.

The Japanese became bolder and 5 years after “annexing” Manchuria, invaded China’s East coast, thus beginning a war that would become part of WWII and last about 8 years(It temporarily drove the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists together for resistance to Japan. That cooperation ended a long time ago as the current situation regarding Taiwan would attest.)

In the case of the Anschluss it’s more obvious. After finding that his combination of bullying words and marching troops had worked again in Austria, the emboldened Hitler went on to threaten Czechoslovakia. This set up the Munich Conference and the agreement that many thought had prevented another world war. It didn’t.

The “message” from all of this for leaders today is, I dislike to admit, a mixed one. On the one hand it is still never a good thing to give into a dictator trying any kind of diplomatic blackmail. It usually whets their appetite.

But our adversary is different from Tojo, Mussolini or Hitler in that he has a power they did not. He has the power to unleash forces that might destroy not just physical structures and millions of lives in many countries, but the basis of civilization itself. Other than those weapons he appears to be stalemated for at least a long present time and perhaps permanently. He seems unable to win on the ground regardless of how many young Russian lives he throws into the greedy maw of wartime Ukraine and the unfailingly steadfast Ukrainian army. But the other threat casts a shadow over everything else. The drones are a powerful weapon for Russia because they can cause mayhem in Ukrainian cities no matter how degraded the army is. But there is some thought that Russia has only a few left and apparently there could be trouble obtaining more of them. thought Iran reportedly is helping them. They(the Russians)now seem to be relying upon cooperation from Iran and maybe North Korea to keep them in weapons, and China might join in. The very recent visit of the Chinese President is a bad sign from the Ukrainian/Western point of view, but the results are not clear yet. There are, thankfully, now some indications that Putin got only part of what he wanted.

So Putin may acquire the means, mainly in drones and airplanes, of winning the war in a “conventional” manner., But he may not and eventually, sooner or later run out of options except for trying to get out of this mess with some dignity and face-saving. Or, he could be considering his “ultimate” weapons, germ warfare, chemical warfare and tactical nuclear weapons. The use of any of these, especially the last named, is too much to think about. But our leaders need to do so–“our” meaning not just in Washington but in all of the nations involved, directly or indirectly, in this.

Assuming that Putin is not disturbed enough to seriously consider the ultimate weapons,(or can be dissuaded from it) what other choices has he? No really good ones, from the Russian point of view, or at least none that the West and Ukraine would accept. A “status quo ante bellum” deal would not likely work for Putin. It would mean that Russia had gone through all of this for no gain at all. But to give him the four provinces he claims to have annexed would likely be vetoed by the Ukrainians. They might well(not without reason)regard this as rewarding aggression by giving the aggressor at least part of what he wanted.

Of course, Russia has taken some serious hits here and parts of Russian society seem to be in a nasty, rebellious mood, although morale is, unfortunately, higher than one might think. Still, Putin may have to take into account all the people who have had personal family losses and who may not want a “surrender;” but then the are also those who hate the way everything is going and whose young men have fled the country and may be resistant to any policy which does not seem to be moving toward peace.

The lessons of WWI and WWII which I cited above are not encouraging as they suggest that giving into an aggressor simply means he will keep going. But the ultimate weapon issue somewhat trumps this. What if Germany had developed nuclear weapons and the V-1 and V-2 rockets which terrorized the UK late in the war had had nuclear warheads?

There is no obvious, perhaps no really believable way out of this. My own opinion is that if Putin is minimally sane he won’t go for broke on this. There would be no use in ruling a Europe poisoned by nukes. There is no glory in being them emperor of dystopia. I think that the best we can hope for is that the West already has made clear to him(and continues to do so)that any use of these weapons will result in overwhelming retaliation and will eliminate any chance of his ever being a Russian “hero,” let along a European or a world one.

At this point I Ieave the matter to rest, at least for now. Please share any thoughts regarding this at jnjcfloh@webtv.net